1991 Terror Hawk NWO Pistol

I wonder if the allied coalition were as knowledgeable about their complicit duplicity on a war with former US backed dictators as they are now? The invasion of Kuwait was as US sanctioned as 911. The next question is - who do these puppets really take their orders from??? - Dan F.
Desert Storm Glock

This was a 1991 series of 1000 Glock 17s which had special engraving on it. A list of names of all the coalition countries is engraved down the top of the slide; "Operation Desert Storm/January 16-February 27, 1991" is engraved on the right side. On the left side is "New World Order / Commemorative".

The first 15 Desert Storm Glocks were special presentation models and had the special "bright black" finish. The special engraving on these was also slightly altered from the standard. These pistols were supposed to go to:

UD000US: George Bush, Commander-in-Chief
UD001US: Gen. H. Norman Schwartzkopf III
UD002US: James Baker III
UD003US: Gen. Colin Powell
UD004US: Dick Cheney
UD005US: Brent Scowcroft
UD006US: Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelly
UD007US: Lt. Gen. Chuck Horner
UD008US: Maj. Gen. Robert B Johnston
UD009US: Lt. Gen. Calvin Waller
UD010US: Lt. Gen. Walter Boomer
UD011US: Vice Adm. Stanley Arthur
UD012US: Maj. Gen. William "Gus" Pagonis
UD013US: Brig. Gen. Richard Neal

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I wonder what barbaric acts they will commit in our name as their false war with Iran progresses?

1 comment:

John Maszka said...

While diplomacy with Iran may have its challenges, it should be pursued at every length. Iran has a conscription army and nearly 10 million eligible males between the ages of 18 and 32 (Posen, 2003). Iran’s conventional military potential aside, US Intelligence assesses that Iran will likely have nuclear weapons capability within the decade (Select Committee on Intelligence, 2006). The United States needs to be very aware of Iran’s growing political influence in the international community as well. In a sermon commencing the month of Ramadan 2007, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei accused the Bush administration of war crimes in Iraq, and of attempting to undermine Islam in the Middle East. Amidst chants from worshipers: “Death to America,” Khamenei stated that he has “a firm belief that one day this current US president and the American officials will be tried in a fair international court for the atrocities committed in Iraq.” The Ayatollah’s denunciation came just one day after President Bush’s demand that Iran and Syria put an end to their efforts to foil democratization in Iraq. The President’s remarks were based on the report from General Petraeus, indicating that Iran is fighting a “proxy war” in Iraq. In response, Khamenei compared president Bush to Hitler and Saddam Hussein (AFP, 2007).
American popularity worldwide has plummeted over the 2003 invasion of Iraq and Khameinei’s word’s are falling upon a rising number of sympathetic ears. Any inclination the Bush administration has toward regime change in Iran should be given very, very careful thought. Ultimately, the situation confronting the United States regarding Iran is identical in many respects to the threat of terrorism itself: A clash of cultures, a stubborn battle of wills, two very different ways of looking at the same reality, a global game of chicken in which neither side wants to back down. This of course is a gross oversimplification of a very complex problem, but there are some basic truths to the argument. The United States and Europe are largely divided on their views of Iran, as well as their views of how best to counter terrorism. One of the greatest challenges facing the United States in its efforts to counter terrorism, is learning to understand those who resort to its use, and developing a coherent construct within which to address terrorism. The same can be said of Iran. And few can argue that there is no small amount of testosterone in the air, and this stubbornness can be seen on both sides of the standoff. Henry Kissinger has aptly stated that “so long as Iran views itself as a crusade rather than a nation, a common interest will not emerge from negotiations.” But this observation is equally applicable to the Bush administration as well. (Reprinted in Simes, 2007:10).